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Abstract
Few would disagree with the assertion that safe engineering starts from the early stages of system
design and should be maintained throughout the lifecycle. Dierent engineering domains have
developed, mostly informal, frameworks with which they hope to promote this attitude. An
interesting question for the KBS community is whether some of our methods for knowledge
representation and reasoning can be used to assist in understanding, representing and interpreting
such frameworks. This paper concentrates on what is (arguably) the area of greatest concern:
relating system requirements to high level design. We highlight what appear to be the major
diculties which face us in this area, using examples from systems which have been built to tackle
them.
1 Introduction
It has been suggested that the majority of software failures stem from misunderstandings of the
operational requirements of applications. Combined with this, we may find that arguments for the
safety of software, in the context of system requirements, are poorly articulated. In this paper we
discuss a number of approaches that may be taken to provide formal representations of key aspects
of system requirements and to linking these to safety arguments. In particular, we are interested in
studying how knowledge-based approaches may assist in:
. representing and reasoning about system requirements;
. articulating arguments for the safety of a system;
. harnessing domain knowledge to control the generation of system requirements.
We should be explicit over precisely what aspects of the software lifecycle we are aiming to support.
Figure 1 outlines a fairly standard ‘‘V-model’’ for software development. As a high level view, this
outlines the progression from requirements elicitation, through specification, detailed design and
coding. Once coded, modules are tested individually, then tested further as they are integrated into
the complete system. Finally, once the system is complete, system tests and then acceptance tests are
performed. The horizontal lines indicate the relevant aspect of the development process that the
system is being tested against in a particular test phase. For example, during the acceptance tests one
is verifying that the final implemented system meets the requirements agreed in the requirements
document. In the system tests, on the other hand, one is validating the implemented system against
the specification.
As it stands, this provides a rather weak (in terms of poorly controlled) software development
process. Of particular concern is the implication that testing is an activity that is carried out during
the late stages of the process. This is indeed the case in many projects. However, this has a serious
3Paul Krause started work on this paper whilst a member of the Advanced Computation Laboratory, Imperial
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problem. Faults that are introduced in the early phases of the development process are often detected
in the latest phases, at a point when they are deeply entrenched in the system design, and hence most
expensive to correct. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of this. Maisey and Dick (1996) used
the idea of a defect grid to analyse the eectiveness of software development processes. They are
read in an analogous way to the grids of distances between towns found in road atlases. The number
in a square formed by the intersection of a ‘‘row’’ and a ‘‘column’’ is the number of faults detected at
the phase labelling the row that were introduced during the phase labelling the column. For
example, in the hypothetical case illustrated, seven defects detected during the acceptance tests were
introduced during the requirements phase. Although this is a hypothetical case, it is based on data
derived from a real project.
As mentioned, defects introduced early and detected late can be very expensive to correct. The
ideal to strive for is a software development process whereby all defects are detected at the earliest
stage possible. The use of structured or more formal development methods can help with this in two
ways. Firstly, the product of a given phase can be verified against the product of the preceding phase
(a detailed design verified against a specification, for example), so reducing the chance of
introducing defects. Secondly, the generation of the product of a given phase can help validate the
product of the preceding phase (the design activity may highlight inconsistencies in the specification,
for example), so introducing an early test activity.
Now, although there are structured, semi-formal and formal approaches which can be followed
from specification through to the later phases of the software process, the requirements elicitation
phase is much less well supported. The provision of appropriate formal support is a hard problem,
Figure 1 Standard ‘‘V-model’’ for the software development process
Figure 2 A hypothetical defect grid, redrawn after Maisey and Dick (1996). Note, ‘‘rows’’ travel from bottom
left to top right, whilst ‘‘columns’’ travel from top left to bottom right
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for reasons which will be enlarged upon in the next section. Nevertheless, if we are to achieve the
goal of enabling validation and verification activities to be carried out from the early phases of a
project, it is vital that this problem be addressed.
The use of the word ‘‘vital’’ in the previous sentence makes for a strong claim. However, recent
work clearly demonstrates that additional eort invested in the requirements elicitation phase of a
project has a significant payo in the later phases of the project (Blackburn et al., 1996). The savings
in rework due to missing or misunderstood requirements are substantial, with additional benefits
accruing through the earlier realisation of a stable functional specification and shared under-
standing of the project goals. In the case of object-oriented specification and design, Jacobsen’s use-
cases provide a tool for eliciting an initial model in terms which are readily understandable by all
project stakeholders (e.g. Gough et al. 1995). However, as yet formal methods such as Z provide no
such technique. Guides to the use of formal languages, of which Woodcock and Davis (1996) is a
good example but still typical in this respect, start with a specification and then proceed through
refinement and proof to an implementation. They are agnostic as to how the engineers identify what
is to be specified in the first place. What is needed is support for the elicitation and analysis of
requirements in a language which is communicable to all project stakeholders, yet is suciently
precise that the resulting model can provide a basis for the development of a formal specification.
The goal of this paper is to stimulate further work in this area by using three examples of
approaches that have been taken. Although they provide partial solutions to the problem, they are
also used as a framework for discussing and illustrating some of the diculties that remain to be
addressed.
2 Components of a safety argument
In the introduction, we discussed the aim of studying how knowledge-based approaches may help in
the representation of, reasoning about and generation of system requirements. We also mentioned
the wish to link key aspects of system requirements to safety arguments. However, there is a need to
be clear about precisely which form of safety arguments are of chief concern. The MOD Defence
Standard 00–55 (UK Ministry of Defence, 1995a,b) requires two forms of argument:
(a) deterministic arguments, which are essentially arguments that the Software Requirements
Specification (SRS) is logically correct;
(b) arguments based on observing the behaviour of the SRS.
The second form of arguments are essentially derived from testing the implemented system, and are
not covered in this paper. The first form of argument are of an analytic nature and are the concern of
this paper.
Safety arguments are sophisticated and may combine many dierent forms of evidence. Certainly,
they must include at least some description of the requirements (describing what we would like) and
the system itself (describing what the designers intend us to get). This minimal classification is
enough to distinguish some key problems in representing safety arguments:
1. How can we be precise in our description of requirements or systems without alienating our
clients, who may not be familiar with the formal languages needed for this task?
2. How can we relate requirements to system descriptions, given that the concepts used to describe
each may be dierent?
3. Since safety arguments are seldom watertight, how can we be more explicit about our residual
uncertainty and the debate leading up to commitments in our current design?
These are basically a re-expression of the basic problems of requirements engineering (see, e.g.,
Flynn et al., 1997). The user-developer culture gap is leading to an increasing trend towards
providing techniques to enable users to build requirements models (Greenspan, 1995). Yet,
especially in safety critical systems, we still need precise descriptions of requirements that can be
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related to the more formal systems descriptions that the developers need. This leads to problems (1)
and (2). Furthermore, there is increasing awareness that requirements are not objective, but
emergent (Dobson and Strens, 1994); they are socially constructed by the interactions that take
place within the requirements process. Thus we can never be sure that a requirements document is
complete and correct in any absolute sense. This is as true of the safety properties of the specified
system, as it is of any other aspect. Nevertheless, as experience develops in a certain domain, we may
be able to identify certain codes of practice, norms and obligations, which a requirements
specification can be checked against. This is essentially the reasoning behind problem (3), and
motivates the inclusion of the work that is described in section 5 of this paper. As far as we are
aware, these are the key current ‘‘meta-concerns’’ in the requirements engineering domain and so
are used as the focus of this paper.
Problems (1) and (3) apply equally to requirements and system descriptions. In this paper, we
adopt the simplest approach of using the same formal language to describe both components. This
supports a move towards a seamless approach to these two stages in system development. However,
it does not entirely solve problem (2) because, although the formal system in which we operate may
be uniform, the vocabulary we use for each component may be dierent.
In the remainder of this paper we examine the extent to which formal languages (of the sort
familiar to computational logicians and many knowledge engineers) can help to cope with each of
these problems. To make our discussion concrete we give examples of systems which have been
targeted at each issue and assess how closely they meet their goals. Although they are valuable
contributions, none of these systems give definitive answers to any of the questions we raise.
However, they are representative of what can currently be done and give an indication of the limits
to what can be achieved with current methods. Section 3 is a response to the first of our problems; it
looks at methods for relating natural language to formal language in the context of requirements
specifications. Section 4 considers the second problem by demonstrating methods for linking
constraints imposed by a code of practice to the elements of construction of a specification for a
safety shutdown system. Section 5 addresses our third problem by looking at ways in which we may
use formal languages to represent and reason about safety arguments for specifications.
All of the systems we describe are domain specific in the final analysis. In section 3 we are able to
provide translations from ‘‘natural’’ to formal language by making two restrictions. Firstly the
lexicon is limited to that of a particular domain. Secondly, a fixed association is used between the
grammatical structure of English sentences and the syntactic structure of the formal language. If the
domain were changed, then it would almost certainly be necessary to alter the lexicon and possibly
all the grammatical mappings. In section 4 we connect requirements and systems specifications
through structural ‘‘schemata’’ which associate patterns in the system specification with properties
which are known to be sought in the requirements specification. Again, if the domain were to be
changed, then those properties, and therefore the links, might also change. Even in section 5 the
symbols used to describe preferences and obligations would have meanings grounded in particular
domains. These would change as we moved between domains.
In consequence, none of the systems presented in this paper provides a definitive, general-purpose
answer to the problems we have raised. This is not surprising as in most of the systems the role of
domain specific components is to help fit the system to the work practices of a given domain.
Although this limits the ease with which the systems can be used without specific domain expertise, it
does make themmore immediately relevant to application problems. A more extensive discussion of
the value of domain-specific formal specification can be found in Robertson (1996).
3 Controlled natural language for requirements specifications
3.1 Features of requirements specifications
Requirements documents for software systems are generally written as natural language documents,
perhaps augmented by Data Flow Diagrams (DFD) or some other graphical representation.
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Guidelines can be usefully followed to structure the requirements document and ensure that key
areas are addressed. In addition, there are some widely used categorisations of the statements that
are included in a requirements document. It will be useful to revisit these here for reference during
the remainder of the paper.
The key feature of a requirements specification is that it should be primarily concerned with
‘‘what’’ rather than ‘‘how’’. It could be argued that such a document should only concern itself with
the function of the intended system. Inclusion of statements of how that function be achieved may
unreasonably constrain the design process and lead to the development of software which is dicult
to port to a dierent or upgraded environment. Nevertheless, for pragmatic reasons it may be
necessary to include such non-functional requirements as part of the requirements document; it may
be essential to use a specific processor type, or there may be restrictions on memory usage imposed
by cost or space constraints, for example. Indeed, when one is considering safety critical systems
high level properties concerning, for example, space, speed, number of active users, robustness and
interruptability can become essential requirements and design decisions must necessarily take them
into account. We make the following distinction:
. Functional requirements are only concerned with what the system is to do.
. Non-functional requirements are constraints that must be imposed on the design decisions.
Both functional and non-functional requirements must be satisfied by the software design. There
may also be additional conditions which are merely used to guide the design process where free
choice exists. For example, a preference might be expressed to maximise access time at the expense
of increased memory usage, rather than producing a memory ecient piece of code with slower
access time. Such requirements are usually referred to as goals:
. Goals are conditions which guide the design process where free choice exists.
Just ensuring that the functional requirements, non-functional requirements and goals are clearly
identified can add significantly to the eectiveness of a requirements document. However, if these
requirements statements are expressed in natural language, they may still be open to problems of
ambiguity, incompleteness, imprecision and lack of clarity. There have been suggestions that formal
specification languages might be used to eliminate some of these problems. The problem here is that
such specifications are not easily communicable to non-mathematicians. Consequently, few domain
specialists would be prepared to accept such a document as a contract for the software system
(Sommerville, 1992). Fuchs and Schwitter (Fuchs and Schwitter, 1995; Schwitter and Fuchs, 1996)
propose the use of controlled natural language to improve the quality of requirements specifica-
tions, whilst still maintaining their readability. This has led to the development of the Attempto
system.
3.2 The Attempto system
In Attempto, natural language is restricted to a controlled subset with a well-defined syntax and
semantics. The intent was to find a subset that was suciently expressive for the domain specialists,
whilst being accurately and eciently interpretable by computer. This interpretation follows a two-
step process. Firstly a natural language statement is transformed into a Discourse Representation
Structure (DRS). This enables ambiguities and inter-text references (e.g., anaphora and abbrevia-
tions) to be resolved. Secondly, the DRS may be (optionally) translated into a Prolog representation
which is executable. By ‘‘executable’’ it is meant that questions may be asked (in controlled natural
language) of the specification; the Prolog representation is at too high a level to be considered as a
prototype implementation. Although Fuchs and Schwitter do not discuss this explicitly, it would
seem that the Prolog representation might also be used as the basis of a detailed formal specification,
written initially in Horn clause logic.
The specific natural language used in Attempto is English, so for brevity we will refer to
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Controlled English in the remainder of this section. As a minimal model, the following constructs
are supported:
. simple declarative sentences of the form subject-verb-object;
. if-then sentences;
. yes/no-queries and wh(at)-queries.
In addition, the controlled English text can contain:
. anaphoric references, e.g., pronouns;
. relative clauses, both subject and object modifying;
. comparative clauses;
. compound phrases (and-lists and or-lists);
. negation;
. abbreviations;
. ellipsis as reduction of coordinates.
Attempto has been demonstrated by specifying a simple automated teller machine ‘‘SimpleMat’’
(SM). The resolution of possible ambiguities can be demonstrated with the following fragment of
the specification.
The customer enters a card and a numeric personal code. If it
is not valid then SM rejects the card.
Here the anaphoric reference via the pronoun ‘‘it’’ is most likely intended to be to the personal code,
but it could be the validity of the card that is being questioned. Attempto contains a Parser and a
Discourse Handler which together check sentences for syntactical correctness and analyse and
resolve inter-text references. A paraphrase explaining how Attempto has interpreted the input is
also generated and presented back to the user for checking. In this case, the paraphrase is:
the customer enters a card and the customer [same object]
enters [same predicator] a numeric personal_code.
if it [personal_code] is not valid then sm [simplemat] rejects
the card [same object].
If this statement does not conform to the user’s intent then they must modify the original
specification to generate a revised interpretation.
Whilst parsing a sentence, the parser must check for correctness against a predefined Definite
Clause Grammar together with a predefined lexicon. The lexicon can be modified via an appropriate
editor, which may be called during the parsing process if an undeclared term is encountered. The
resolution of references between sentences is eected by using Discourse Representation Theory to
provide a semantic structure for a given sentence in the context of the preceding sentences (Kamp
and Reyle, 1993; Covington et al., 1988). Our running example yields the following Discourse
Representation Structure (DRS):
[A, B, C, D]
customer(A)
card(B)
enter(A, B)
numeric(C)
personal_code(C)
enter(A, C)
named(D, simplemat)
IF:
[]
NOT:
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[]
valid(C)
THEN:
[]
reject(D, B)
The DRS has the important function of forcing the resolution of any ambiguities present in the
Controlled English representation. Attempto has fixed strategies for doing this, and if the user
wishes to alter the interpretation they must alter the structure of the input sentence, as indicated
above. This is a valuable contribution, but there is another benefit of using this representation. The
DRS can be straightforwardly translated into Prolog clauses. In Attempto these are wrapped up in a
term fact/1 and asserted into the knowledge base. In the case of SimpleMat we have:
fact(customer(0)).
fact(card(1)).
fact(enter(0, 1)).
fact(numeric(2)).
fact(personal_code(2)).
fact(enter(0,2)).
fact(named(3, simplemat)).
fact((reject(3,1):- neg(valid(2)))).
Note that the discourse referents are replaced by Skolem constants (0, 1, 2, etc.).
Once translated into Prolog, the specification can be ‘‘executed’’. That is, the Prolog database can
be queried with events being asserted to build up a trace of behaviour. Figure 3 provides a schematic
of the overall system.
Figure 3 Overview of the Attempto system
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3.3 Critique
Attempto seems best fitted to deal with the purely functional component of a requirements
specification. Non-functional requirements and goals may, of course, be expressed in Controlled
English. However, it seems that Attempto will merely be able to record these statements as
assertions without supporting any further analysis of their potential impact on design decisions
and possible behaviours of completed systems. As yet there are no published accounts of using
Attempto on a significantly sized application. Perhaps the most significant contribution of
Attempto is that it enables a requirements specification to be compiled into a logical theory. This
may then be queried and reasoned over using the automatic theorem prover Prolog.
This ability to reason over the requirements specification means that some aspects of the
validation of the specification can be automated. One could, for example, identify certain general
properties that a certain class of applications should satisfy, and check to see if an instance of this
class specified using Attempto conformed to these norms. However, as it stands, Attempto oers no
specific mechanism to support such a function. In the next section, we shall review one approach to
handling this problem.
4 Automated reasoning support for design
4.1 Description of the requirements assistant
The work described in the previous section provides support for eliciting an unambiguous
requirements specification, with there being some capability for reasoning about the resulting
specification. An obvious next step is to see if some automated support can be given to the
generation of a more detailed system design which satisfies the requirements specification. If one is
looking to develop safety critical, or other high integrity, systems, then there may also be scope for
using some formalisation of regulations or guidelines to constrain further the design choices that
may be made. In this section we will look at a Requirements Assistant (RA) which is an interactive
system for formalising and managing requirements, including guideline and regulatory require-
ments (Hesketh et al. 1997).
RA is a toolset which assists designers in managing the process of working with large complex
collections of requirements, with particular emphasis on safety critical systems. The system has been
demonstrated in the context of the development of a specific safety critical application: the design of
emergency shutdown systems for drilling rigs. However, the techniques are generally applicable and
could be usefully explored in the context of software rather than hardware development.
Given an outline functional specification, relevant requirements from guidelines, or some other
corpus of knowledge, are found automatically and checked before being notified to the designer
with a note of whether or not they are currently satisfied. As design proceeds, progress in satisfying
requirements is monitored automatically and contributing choices are recorded. Such evidence of
adherence to guidelines is an endorsement of the validity of the design. In the absence of (or perhaps
in addition to) formal guidelines or regulations, one might look to developing a corpus of
knowledge based on past experience to provide similar validation checks. During any subsequent
system modification, reference to this information can subsequently aid designers by drawing
attention to the implications changes will have on maintaining guideline satisfaction.
RA has been demonstrated using guidelines from Shell’s code of practice for emergency shutdown
systems. We will look at an example where the device being controlled is a turbo-generator, and the
sensor that might initiate shutdown of the device is a drilling warning sensor. Some general
requirements from Shell’s code of practice that might be applicable include:
G1. All trip demands cause shutdown of the appropriate outputs.
G2. On shutdown, outputs shall latch in the de-energised state until the initiating condition has
cleared and a manual reset of the logic has been performed.
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G3. Field devices may be reset. Reset shall be achieved by the provision of local push-buttons
incorporated into each output control device.
From G2 a human designer would conclude that the drilling warning sensor should be in logic level
1 during normal operation, but latch to 0 when an error occurs. This is normal fail-safe practice.
Furthermore all the signals which could trip the turbo-generator (including that from the drilling
warning sensor) should be logically ANDed. This will ensure that any single error will initiate a trip
and cause shutdown of the device, thus satisfying G1. To complete satisfaction of G2, the output of
the AND gate should be fed back as one of its inputs, thus ensuring that the error condition persists.
G3 now remains to be satisfied. In order to override the error condition, the reset signal needs to
be at logic level 1 and must cancel the logical 0 persisting from the error state. This can be achieved
by ORing the reset and the latch and feeding this into the AND gate instead of the raw latch signal.
Figure 4 illustrates the resulting logic diagram.
The top-level goal of the Requirements Assistant is to provide support for some formalisation of a
set of requirements, and then assist in ensuring that any specific design meets those requirements
that are relevant to the design context currently under consideration. RA requires that the
formalisation of requirements be in a sequent-based logic which is decidable, but other than that
imposes no constraints on the formal language chosen. It provides a tool which allows a designer to
read an English text on-line, mark phrases or sentences, and then record their translation in
whatever formal language has been chosen. Note that this translation is carried out by hand and not
mechanically, as in Attempto.
Although RA does not provide a mechanical translation of the requirements, once translated the
formalisation is supported by:
. an interface which allows the designer to browse through the satisfied and outstanding
requirements;
. links back from requirements expressed formally to the (viewable) natural language from which
they originated, thus allowing designers to see the formalised parts in context;
. a theorem prover which can display complete and incomplete proofs, attempt automatic proofs
and accept designer instructions;
. display of the formal language either as sequents or in a simple translation to a pseudo-english
translation.
The intent is that it be left open to whoever maintains the design support system to use a more
detailed formalisation for critical parts of the system and less detailed ones elsewhere. However,
experience to date has been focused on the use of a restricted form of first order logic. We will make
some suggestions as to alternative logics that might fruitfully be used later on in this paper.
Let us now revisit the running example. It was mentioned above that the formal language used
must be sequent-based. In fact, the sequents used are a slight adaptation of the standard
interpretation of a sequent calculus in that the hypothesis list is used to specify the context in
which a requirement is applicable. In addition, the language used in the demonstrator is augmented
with an infix operator ‘‘->>’’ which is used to denote causation. In this language, the requirements
G1, G2 and G3 above are formalised as the following four statements:
Figure 4 Logic diagram of latched reset
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machine(X), initiator(I), expected_consequence(I,X)
‘ tripped(I) ->> shut_down(X) R1.
machine(X),
Bs = {B | initiator(B)^expected_consequence(B,X)}
‘ reset(X) ^ (V s (on(s, Bs) ^ ok_signal(s))) ->>
ok_signal(X) R2.
machine(X) ‘ A r local_reset(r) ^ resets(r, X) R3.
machine(X)
shut_down(X) ^ not_reset(X) ->> latched(X) R4.
Note that all free variables that occur in the hypothesis list of a sequent are universally quantified
across the whole of the sequent. These sequents have a general reading of Context ‘ Requirement.
That is, if the conjunction of formulae on the l.h.s. of the entailment relation symbol ‘ is valid, then
the requirement on the right hand side applies.
It should be emphasised again that R1–R4 provides a formalisation of the requirements G1–G3,
but not necessarily the only one. The selection of the context for any requirement is a matter of
judgement. If the contexts are too general, the designer will be deluged with irrelevant requirements.
On the other hand, if they are too specific they might not ever apply until the requirement was close
to being satisfied anyway. In addition, the precise statements that are elicited from a set of
requirements is also a matter of judgement. The statement R2, which says that if a machine has
been reset and all sensors that control the machine signal an OK signal then the machine will return
to operation, could be omitted with the remaining set of statements superficially providing a
satisfactory account of G1–G3. In fact, making explicit such implicit requirements can be an
important function of the formalisation process. However, precisely what needs explicating, and
how, are matters of judgement and these elements of judgement have an important implication.
Satisfaction of all relevant sequents should not be regarded as proof that a design satisfies the
corresponding English language code of practice. Rather, they are arguments supporting the
validity of a design. With the relatively lightweight formalisations used in RA the usability of the
system is increased, but the full precision of detailed formalisation is sacrificed.
At this stage, we have the machinery to check a design to see if all relevant requirements are
satisfied, and to prompt the designer with those that are not. However, before this checking can be
carried out, we must be able to specify the components in a design. The RA contains files of
schemata that specify the objects that can be selected and added to a design. In fact, as we shall see
later, RA itself can select objects to propose as solutions to unsatisfied requirements.
Each schema has a name, a (possibly empty) context list, a list of components which constitute the
object, and the factual contributions it makes to the design. A schema’s context is used to instantiate
variables which exist elsewhere in the schema, thus grounding the instance that is created and its
contributions. These contributions are phrased in the same language as the requirements, and the
objects are specifically designed to provide contributions which explicitly meet one or more of the
formal requirement statements. An example of a schema which is relevant to our running example is
that of a latched reset circuit which introduces a latch and links it to the reset control. The context in
which it can be applied consists of a machine, its set of initiators and its local reset control. This
particular schema demonstrates the possibility of parameterisation with the variable Is correspond-
ing to a list which could be instantiated to any number of initiators. It corresponds to the circuit
shown in figure 4 where the initiators Is are ANDed with the signal that results from the ORing of
the local reset and the AND gate output.
name: latchedreset
context: machine(O)
Is = {X | initiator(X) ^ expected_consequence(X,O)}
reset(R)
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local_reset(R)
components: and([Or| Is], O)
or([R, O], Or)
contributions: [on(I,Is)] ‘ tripped(I) ->> shut_down(O)
[] ‘ (shut_down(O) ^ not_reset(O) ->> latched(O))
[] ‘ reset(O) ^ V j : (on(j, Is) ^ ok_signal(j)) ->> ok_signal(O)
[] resets(R, O)
Note that [R, O] denotes the list containing only the two elements R and O, whilst [Or| Is] denotes
the list constructed from adjoining the element Or to the beginning of the list Is.
The latchedreset schema has four explicit contributions. However, these can provide more than
four contributed facts when instantiated if there are multiple ways of satisfying the hypotheses
derived from the Code of Practice (R1, . . . , R4 in this case).
Note also that of there is more than one intitiator in the Is list, RA will make an instantiated copy
of the first contribution for each one. It is now straightforward to see that incorporation of an
appropriate instance of this schema into a design for a turbo-generator control circuit will ensure
that the formal statements R1–R4 are satisfied.
Using the above basic machinery, RA can provide support for the following management tasks.
Noticing when requirements apply
As objects are added and design steps taken, RA checks for relevant requirements incrementally.
Keeping track of all the dierent requirements
The RAmaintains lists of all the satisfied and the unsatisfied requirements being invoked. When RA
has established that a requirement is satisfied, it is added to the list of satisfied requirements together
with the argument for its satisfaction. If RA concludes that a requirement is not satisfied, the
instance and any partial argument relating to its satisfaction are put on a list of outstanding
requirement obligations. When a new design step is taken, not only must any new requirements be
recorded and checked, but the implications for existing satisfied and unsatisfied requirements and
their associated arguments must also be evaluated. This automated book keeping is an important
contribution of RA.
Assessing the extent to which requirements are currently satisfied
A designer may examine complete as well as partial arguments for a requirement’s satisfaction. The
designer may examine and work on these proofs interactively.
Proposing remedial design for unsatisfied requirements
Since at any stage, the designer has the obligation of satisfying outstanding requirements but is only
allowed to achieve this by inserting prescribed components from RA’s database, RA can oer
advice by second guessing. The advice is calculated by looking at the applicable schemas’
contributions and seeing which schema satisfies the greatest number of outstanding requirements
in relation to the current context. If there is a tie, it is resolved by preferring solutions which do not
add unexpected contributions, since they are likely to add unnecessary complexity.
Evidence of requirements’ satisfaction
The evidence is the proof, or argument, for each hypothesis derived from the Code of Practice which
RA has automatically constructed using the facts supplied by the designer’s addition of objects and
their contributions and relationships. Since positive evidence is needed to back up averrals of
requirements’ satisfaction, only constructive proofs are admitted. That is, proofs which only infer
from things which exist or which can be constructed from things which exist.
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Accounting for the roles played by dierent components
Designers need to know the roles played by components in satisfying requirements in order to know
what the implications are of changing or removing them. The constructive proof for each
requirement records the contributions made by all the components involved. The contributions of
any component can be inferred by looking at all the requirement arguments in which it occurs.
Remembering requirements’ influence on the design decisions
As well as knowing the components’ contributions to meeting requirements, designers need to know
which requirements have been incorporated and how they have been satisfied by component
choices. The influence of each requirement is apparent from all the instances of it which appear as
requirement justification arguments. All the arguments are dependent on the components which
appear in them.
4.2 Critique
The formalisations of requirements in RA have no guarantees that they are strict translations of
their corresponding english language statements. Links are present in RA relating formalisations to
their associated text statement in the Code of Practice so that a designer can check their decisions
against this. It may be worth exploring the possibility of integrating RA with a controlled natural
language front end to support requirements elicitation and expression in a more readily formalisable
form, although such a system will make great demands on the language support.
The RA has been demonstrated in the context of the development of control circuitry for safety
shutdown systems. The systems of concern are hardware, but the potential for applying RA to
software development is a specific interest in the context of this paper. This has not been
demonstrated conclusively but one can envisage producing a corpus of general, formalisable,
software requirements that are applicable in specific contexts. The relevant schemata could then be
formalisable program fragments, skeletons that may be refined into specific instances which provide
specified contributions to a software design. In addition, the basic representational framework of
RA is a development of the technology used in the EcoLogic (EL) Project (Robertson et al., 1991).
EL used schematic definitions of software modules to enable programs for running ecological
models to be interactively generated. System development is controlled dierently in RA and EL.
Nevertheless, EL provides a strong witness to the validity of the assertion that RA could be used for
software development.
Referring back to the discussion of validation in the critique of Attempto in section 3.1, one of the
key features of RA is that it does provide some support for the validation of a design. Because RA
does not have a rigorously defined mapping between the english language code of practice and the
formal representation, it cannot guarantee validity. However, it can assist in identifying some of the
main points at which an auditor might wish to validate a designer’s understanding of some part of
the code of practice, or to verify that a particular component possesses a behaviour consistent with
key parts of the code of practice. This is possible because RA maintains links between schemata of
the design and appropriate formal interpretations of the code of practice. It is useful because one of
the diculties in the validation of such systems is simply remembering that the designers have paid
attention, at the right points, to the critical guidelines.
5 Modal languages for automating safety reasoning
5.1 Modalities for Requirements Analysis
We will explore some ideas on using modal logics to extend the language for reasoning about safety
in this section. There are a number of reasons for wishing to use modal logics. Firstly, for example,
we might wish to allow a requirements engineer to distinguish at the language level between
statements of dierent types; in particular, functional requirements, non functional requirements
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(obligations) and goals (recommendations or preferences). Secondly, it is quite often necessary to
incorporate some temporal reasoning in requirement statements. We will illustrate this latter with a
simple example. This example is motivated by a real case which had tragic consequences. In the real
case the complexity of the conditions leading to failure were much more subtle than the following
(Leveson, 1995). The simplification is for ease of exposition, but the original example is real.
A medical radiotherapy system used a high energy radiation source. This could be run in two
modes. In what we will call mode1, the source was run at low power, with the beam targeted directly
at the patient. In mode 2, a lead shield was placed between patient and source with the latter being
run at high power to stimulate secondary emission from the screen. Both source and shield were
controlled by software. Unfortunately, it turned out that with a rarely occurring sequence of
commands, it was possible for the source to be run at high power instantaneously before the shield
was in place. Although the steady state conditions were repeatedly checked, it was this transitory
condition which resulted in several patients receiving severe, and in some cases fatal, radiation
burns.
We can provide an initial simple formalisation of the situation as follows:
mode1 / shield_open ^ low_power
mode2 / shield_closed ^ high_power
shield_open _ shield_closed
low_power _ high_power
As it stands, shield_open ^ high_power is consistent with this theory. We can further refine
the theory by adding the constraint:
:(mode1 ^ mode2)
This will rule out the problematic state as a steady state condition. However, we are not placing any
ordering on the events which may lead to valid steady states, and a valid4 implementation may still
produce transitory states that are potentially lethal. What is needed is a further statement checking
that the shield is always in place before the source is switched to high power.
5.2 Lsafe
A number of approaches have been taken to the development of implementable temporal logics (see
Fisher (1996) for a review). That described in Das and Fox (1993) and Hammond et al. (1994) is of
particular interest in the present context as it contains a number of modalities specifically targeted at
reasoning about safety. We will briefly review it here.
Safety reasoning will in general involve a set of temporally qualified assertions outlining both
what is known about a universe of discourse in dierent periods of time, and the consequences of
actions in dierent conditions. Lsafe was developed to enable such assertions to be expressed as a
logical theory. In order to describe both static and dynamic aspects of the universe of discourse, the
propositional symbols in Lsafe are sorted into properties and actions. In addition, the language of
propositional logic is extended with a number of modalities, including a temporal operator of the
form [t1, t2], where t1  t2 and t1, t2 are non-negative integers. The full set of modalities, with
informal readings, is as follows:
[RECO]a Action a can be recommended
[SAFE]a Action a is safe
[AUTH]a Action a is authorised
[PREF](a,b) Action a is preferred to action b
[OBLG]j Action j or property j is obligatory
4‘‘Valid’’ in the sense that the implementation is a model of the theory.
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[t1, t2]j Action j is taken, or property j is true in the interval t1 to t2.
Some additional notation is provided for brevity of expression. If a is an action and [t1, t2] is the
smallest interval over which that action is taken, then [t1, t2]amay be written as [t1, t2]!a. In addition,
an interval of the form [t, t] represents a time point, and may be written as (t).
We may now write a more satisfactory constraint for our requirements theory concerning the
hypothetical medical scanner.
V t1,t2([t1, t2]high_power ?
A t3,t4(t4<t1 ^ [t3,t4]close_shield ^ [t4,t2]shield_closed))
This says that the close_shield action must have been carried out before a high_power state
is assumed, and that the shutter must remain closed at least for the period during which the
high_power state holds.
The modality [OBLG] is taken from Deontic logic (Chellas, 1980). This is typically used to
describe norms of behaviour; what one ought to do. It can be thought of as a ‘‘strong’’ modality
whose behaviour is to a certain extent analogous to the necessity modality &, or universal
quantification, V. However, as used in Lsafe, there is an important distinction which is of interest
in the present context. In classical modal logic, by saying a sentence j ‘‘necessarily holds’’ it is
meant that j holds in every situation including the present one. This is characterised by the
axiom &j ? j. However, [OBLG]j ? j is not an axiom in Lsafe. This has a rather important
ramification; a theory will still remain consistent even if both [OBLG]j and :j are derivable.
Rather than this being regarded as implying a contradiction, this is regarded as a ‘‘hazardous state’’
of the knowledge base, represented by the special symbol
. That is, if [OBLG]j is derivable from a
knowledge base, then non performance of j, if j is an action, or non-satisfiability of j, if j is a
property, leads to a hazardous state. This is expressed formally by the equivalence:
[OBLG]j  : j? 

The usage of the [OBLG] modality in constraints can be further clarified by considering a notion of
‘‘technological’’ possible worlds (Das, personal communication). A conventional propositional
statement can be used as a hard constraint in the possible worlds that satisfy a certain logical theory;
we could fairly insist that a person’s height have only positive values, for example. In contrast,
although we might normally require that a person be within a certain age range before being
admitted into a cancer therapy trial, this is a technological constraint, and not an inherent property
of the world. As such, a particular patient might violate the constraint, having been admitted onto
the trial for certain pragmatic or judgemental reasons. Although this world is technologically
unsafe, it is not impossible. This latter form of constraint may be distinguished by the use of the
[OBLG] modality in Lsafe.
This has potential value in the formalisation of requirements. We may use the [OBLG] modality
to distinguish non-functional from functional requirements. A valid design must necessarily satisfy
the functional requirements in a specification. However, if the non-functional requirements are
expressed as obligations, this leaves scope for a valid but unsafe design in which one or more of the
non-functional requirements is not satisfied. In particular, we may have a rapid prototype which
demonstrably satisfies the functional requirements, whilst satisfaction of time and space constraints
is temporarily suspended.
The modalities [RECO] and [PREF] lend themselves to the expression of goals. In Lsafe, a
recommended action is not obligatory. [RECO]amerely expresses a recommendation that a should
be made to come about, if it is a property, or occur, if it is an action. The user is free to choose
whether or not to act upon this recommendation. In a similar way, [PREF](a, b) merely expresses a
preference of a over b, without any enforcement of this preference. Thus we might use
[PREF](low_memory_requirement, high_memory_requirement)
to express the goal to prefer design solutions which minimise memory requirements, given that there
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are no overriding constraints. Similarly, we might use [RECO]high_reliability to express
the goal that a system should be as reliable as possible.
5.3 Critique
Lsafe is one of a number of temporal modal logics that have been proposed for use in describing high
level timing requirements. One can view a set of timing constraints expressed in a language such as
Lsafe as expressing a logical theory of the application being developed. A detailed specification in,
say, Timed CCS (TCCS) (Wang Yi, 1991) is then a (possible) model of the logical theory. One then
has a formal framework for verifying that the specification is indeed a model of the theory. In the
case of timed process algebras such as TCCS, a standard approach to this is to run a simulation of
the specification, and see if all possible execution traces satisfy the formulae of the logical theory. If
it is established as a valid model, one may then also exercise the model further to see if it has any
additional, but undesirable, properties; hence using it as a validation check on the requirements
specification.
There is a considerable literature on these approaches to the specification and design of real time
systems (although less in the way of large scale practical experience). See Ostro (1992) for a fairly
recent review. The diculty is that the rather brute force approach of model checking limits the size
of specification that can be handled in this way (e.g. Larsen et al., 1995), although recent experience
indicates that many problems can be decomposed into manageable modules (Roscoe, 1994).
We have chosen to focus on Lsafe because the temporal logic is embedded in a much more
expressive language than most (Modal Action Logic, developed as part of the FOREST project
(Atkinson et al., 1991) also includes the use of deontic modalities). These additional modalities seem
to have a natural application to requirements specification, although experience with their use does
not at present extend outside the domain of clinical protocol specification. We would like to see this
changed.
6 Conclusions
This paper has two purposes. The first is to illustrate a number of styles of approach that may be
taken to pushing a higher degree of formality back towards the earlier stages in the software
development process. The second is to use these examples to illustrate three key problems in
representing safety arguments:
. how can we resolve the tension of developing a language that is specific enough for the domain
experts to be comfortable with, yet which is formal enough to admit detailed analysis;
. how can we relate requirements to system descriptions, when the concepts used to express each
may dier;
. how can we make explicit the uncertainty that necessarily remains, given that safety arguments
are seldom watertight?
We have focused on using formality in analysing and criticising requirements with regard to safety
properties and safety arguments. But the discussion can be equally applicable to any mission critical
aspects of a complex system.
As mentioned at the outset, none of the solutions we oer is a complete one. Although they each
address one of the above questions, none of them attempts a general solution. In addition, they all
ultimately have a meaning grounded in the intended domain of application. One should not be too
pessimistic about this last, however. It may well be that a definitive solution is not necessary. Rather,
it is a matter of striking an appropriate balance, based on the expertise of the domain experts and the
development team. It is perhaps more important to focus on producing a unification of the positive
aspects of the individual results discussed in this paper.
A further refinement would be to extend the expressiveness of the uncertainty handling. The
proposal of this paper (section 5) is to allow uncertainty to be expressed by weakening categorical
Reliable and accountable system design 303
logical arguments by allowing certain obligations, recommendations and preferences to be
expressed. The mere fact of making the arguments explicit and open for inspection, of course, also
means one allows the possibility that someone may doubt the validity of a claim warranted by a
certain line of reasoning. Actually giving some measure of residual uncertainty is, however, a much
more contentious issue, given that one is often predicting on the basis of analogy or sparse data.
However this is an aspect which needs to be explored further.
All of the systems in this paper demonstrate that it is possible to find niches for formal methods in
the early stages of software lifecycles and that this need not involve revolutionary change to existing
practices. Whether this possibility becomes an actuality depends on our ingenuity in embedding
them within an appropriate safety culture. Other papers in this edition touch on this wider issue.
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